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Abstract. In this paper we address some aspects on the feasibility of satellite
quantum communication which we believe are still not well understood. We focus
on the techniques to get a high enough SNR (in particular in the uplink) and to
implement a polarization-preserving channel...
1. Introduction
For the last decades, a strong research effort has been devoted to study how quantum
effects may be employed to manipulate and transmit information, in what is called
Quantum Information Processing [1, 2, 3]. These research activities lead to new
information-processing protocols with no classical counterpart, like quantum key
distribution [4, 5, 6], quantum teleportation [7] or quantum computing [8]. Quantum
Key distribution, in particular, is on its way from research laboratories into the real
world. Fiber and free-space links have been realized linking nodes at larger and larger
distances [9, 10] with higher and higher key generation rates. Network structures have
also been demonstrated recently, for example the DARPA network in Boston [5] and
the SECOQC network in Vienna [11].
However, current fiber and free-space links cannot implement a real global-scale
quantum key distribution system. Fiber links have the advantage that the photon
transfer is scarcely affected by external conditions, like background light, weather or
environmental obstructions. On the other hand the extension of fiber links beyond few
hundred kilometers is problematic, due to attenuation and polarization-preservation
issues. Terrestrial free-space links show some advantages: the atmosphere provides low
absorption and is essentially non-birefringent, allowing almost unperturbed propagation
of polarization states. On the other hand, the optical mode is not confined in
a waveguide, so they are extremely sensitive to the external environment: objects
interposed in the line of sight, beam distortion induced by atmospheric turbulence,
bad weather conditions and aerosols.
A solution to this problem can be the use of Space and satellite technology. Space-
based links can potentially lead to global-scale quantum networking since they allow
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a much larger propagation distance of photonic qubits compared to present terrestrial
links. This is mainly due to the fact that most of the propagation path is in empty space,
with no absorption and turbulence-induced beam spreading, and only a small fraction of
the path (corresponding to less than 10 km) is in atmosphere. However many technical
problems must be overcome in order to realize a working quantum communication link
between Earth and Space. Geostationary satellites are too distant to implement a single
photon link, therefore fast-moving low-orbit satellites (LEO orbit, from 500 to 2000 km
above Earth surface) must be employed.
Several proof-of-principle experiments in this direction have been performed
recently. In 2005 C.-Z. Peng and coworkers reported the first distribution of entangled
photon pairs over 13 km, beyond the effective thickness of the aerosphere [12]. This was
a first significant step towards satellite-based global quantum communication, since it
showed that entanglement can survive after propagating through the noisy atmosphere.
In 2007 two experiments were carried out at Canary islands by a European
collaboration. Entanglement-based [10] and decoy-state [13] quantum key distribution
was realized on a 144 km free-space path, linking La Palma with Tenerife. For these
experiments the Optical Ground Station of the European Space Agency, developed for
standard optical communication between satellites and Earth, was adapted for quantum
communication. It is important to highlight that the twin-photon source was able to
achieve coincidence production rates and entanglement visibility sufficient to bridge the
attenuation expected for satellite-to-ground quantum channels.
In a successive experiment, the feasibility of single-photon exchange for a down-
link between a LEO satellite and an optical ground station (Matera Laser Ranging
Observatory, in the South of Italy) was experimentally demonstrated [14]. The
researchers exploited the retroreflection of a weak laser pulse from a geodetic satellite
covered with corner-cubes (Ajisai, orbiting at around 1400 km) to simulate a single
photon source on a satellite. They showed that, implementing a strong filtering in the
spatial, spectral and temporal domain the emitted photons can be recognized against a
very strong background.
In this paper, we present a detailed analysis of the feasibility of satellite-based
quantum communication which we believe have not yet been adequately discussed in
the literature. In particular, we concentrate on two issues that were identified as crucial
by the experiment performed at Matera Observatory [14]: the possibility of a good
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and the polarization mainteinance in the link. As regards
the SNR we will refine the models already presented in the literature by introducing a
detailed analysis of the effect of atmospheric turbulence and of the background stray-
light in the case of a ground-to-satellite uplink. We will then discuss some filtering
techniques to improve the SNR reducing the noise level; in particular we will analyse in
detail the possibility of high-accuracy temporal filtering. Finally, as long as polarization
control is concerned, we will discuss and compare different strategies to implement a
polarization-conserving channel.
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2. Signal and Noise
Two crucial points for any communication system are the amount of attenuation of the
link and the noise introduced in the system. This is even more important for quantum
communication since the signal transmitted by Alice is ideally one photon (or a weak
coherent pulse with very low mean photon number in many realistic implementations).
Therefore one cannot increase the signal power in order to have a good enough SNR:
the only available tools are the reduction of the link attenuation and of the background
noise. In this section we will analyze a quantum channel between a ground station and a
LEO satellite both in the uplink and the downlink, presenting a model for the expected
attenuation and background noise.
2.1. Signal attenuation
The main factor limiting the performance of free-space optical communication is
atmospheric turbulence, both for terrestrial horizontal links or for links between ground
and satellites. Atmospheric turbulence induces refractive index inhomogeneities, that
increase the amount of spreading for traveling beams [15]. In particular, turbulent
eddies whose size is large compared to the size of the beam induce a deflection of the
beam (beam wandering), while smaller-scale turbulent features induce beam broadening.
In other words, observing a beam which propagates through turbulent atmosphere at
different time instants, one can see a broadened beam randomly deflected in different
directions. When integrating the observation over a time-scale longer than the beam-
wandering characteristic time, the global effect is a large broadening of the beam.
Models for optical beam propagation in the case of uplinks and downlinks between
a satellite and a ground station have been discussed in the literature [16, 17, 18]. In
the case of a Gaussian beam of waist w0 and intensity I0, the average long-term spot
(which is a superposition of moving short-term spots), tends theoretically to a Gaussian
spatial distribution of intensity [17]:
〈I(r, L)〉 = I0e
−2r2/w2
LT (1)
with width wLT , where
w2LT = w
2
ST + 2
〈
β2
〉
(2)
Here wST is the short-term beam width, while β is the instantaneous beam displacement
from the unperturbed position.
It can be shown that, for a collimated beam, the long-term beam width is [17]:
w2LT = w
2
0
(
1 +
L2
Z20
)
+ 2
(
4L
kr0
)2
(3)
where Z0 is the Rayleigh parameter of the beam, L is the propagation distance and r0
is the Fried parameter, given by:
r0 =
[
0.42k2
∫ L
0
C2n(z)
(
L− z
L
)5/3
dz
]−3/5
(4)
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The estimate of r0 in equation (4) was made by integrating the turbulent contribution
of the atmosphere along the whole optical path. The resulting wLT should then be
considered a high bound, and the resulting conclusions as on the safe side. The refractive
index structure constant C2n(z) is taken from Ref. [16] to be:
C2n(h) = 0.00594(v/27)
2(h·10−5)10·e−h/1000+2.7·10−16e−h/1500+A·e−h/100(5)
where A = 1.7 · 10−14 and v = 21m/s. The expression for the short-term width is:
w2ST = w
2
0
(
1 +
L2
Z20
)
+ 2
{
4.2L
kr0
[
1− 0.26
(
r0
w0
)1/3]}2
(6)
The receiving telescope can be described as a circular aperture of radius R, which
collects part of the incoming beam and focuses it on a bucket single-photon detector.
The power P received through a circular aperture of radius R centered on the beam is:
P = 2piI0
∫ R
0
ρe
−2 ρ
2
w2
LT dρ (7)
Figure 1. Attenuation η of the link (dB) as a function of the link distance and receiver
telescope diameter for the long-term beam spreading effect, which takes into account
the effects of beam spreading and wandering. The operating wavelength is λ = 800nm
and the diameter of the Earth-based transmitting telescope is assumed to be 1.5 m.
On the right-side a zoom of the figure on the left for the link distance between 200 and
500 km.
Therefore the link-efficiency η, which we define as the percentage of the received
power with respect to the transmitted one is:
η = η0
(
1− e
−
2R2
w2
LT
)
(8)
The factor η0 comprises the detection efficiency, the pointing losses and the
atmospheric attenuation; we take an empirical factor [19] η0 ≈ 0.1.
Some simulations for the link efficiency are shown in Fig. 1: the link attenuation (in
decibels) is shown as a function of the link distance L and the radius R of the receiving
telescope. In the uplink the beam first travels through the turbulent atmosphere and
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then propagates, aberrated, in the vacuum to the satellite. The initial atmosphere-
induced aberrations greatly increase the beam spreading, resulting in a very strong
attenuation. For a relatively low satellite, at 500 km above the Earth surface, the
attenuation is on the order of more than 50 dB.
Figure 2. On the left,
〈
β2
〉
as a function of the ground-to-satellite distance. On
the right, ratio between
〈
β2
〉
and
〈
w2
ST
〉
. In the case of a LEO satellite, the effect of
beam wandering is clearly limited to less than 10 percent with respect to the beam
spreading; therefore its possible compensation with a tip/tilt active system might not
significantly improve overall performance of the link.
An interesting point is the relative contribution of the beam spreading due to
smaller-scale atmospheric turbulence (described by wST ) and the the beam-wandering
induced by larger-scale eddies (described by 〈β2〉). In principle the beam wandering
could be compensated by means of an active tip/tilt mirror with some kind of feedback
loop. However, as it is shown in Fig. 2, the benefit that one could get is below 10
percent, making such compensation practically worthless.
2.2. Noise
2.2.1. Up-link (day-time operation) During the day the main source of background
noise is the sunlight reflected by the Earth surface into the telescope field of view
(see Fig. 3). Let Hsun be the solar spectral irradiance (photons/ s nm m
2) at one
astronomical unit and aE the Earth albedo; assuming a Lambertian diffusion, for which
the radiance is independent of the angle, the spectral radiant intensity reflected by the
Earth (number of photons per s, nm and sr) is:
SE =
1
pi
aHsunΣ (9)
where Σ is the emitting area seen by the telescope and Hsun = 4.61 ·10
18 photons/ (s nm
m2) at λ = 900 nm. Such photons are collected by an optical system having entrance
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Figure 3. Scheme to calculate the background noise in the uplink. Sun (or Moon)
light is reflected by the Earth surface (with Lambertian diffusion) into the receiving
telescope field-of-view.
aperture raius r and instantaneous field-of-view IFOV , at distance L from the Earth
surface. Therefore the emitting area is:
Σ = (IFOV)2L2 (10)
and the solid angle from which the telescope on the satellite can be seen from Earth is:
Ω =
pir2
L2
(11)
Therefore the number of background photons collected by the optical system per units
of ∆ν and ∆t is:
Nday =
1
pi
aEHsunΣΩ = aEr
2(IFOV )2Hsun (12)
2.2.2. Uplink (night-time operation) The dominant sources of background radiation
from the Earth surface during night are its black-body emission and the reflected moon
light. In realistic situations there will be a significant contribution of scattered light
from human activities, which depends on the specific location considered.
The number of photons per (s nm m2) emitted by a black body, according to Planck’s
law, is:
Sbb =
2c
λ4
1
e
hc
λkT − 1
(13)
At T = 293 K and λ = 800 nm, Sbb = 3.1 · 10
6 photons per (s nm m2).
Let’s now calculate the radiance due to moonlight reflection on the Earth. Given
the solar spectral irradiance Hsun, the number of photons per s and nm which hit the
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Moon surface is: Hsun · piR
2
M where RM is the Moon radius. Assuming Lambertian
diffusion, the number of photons per (s nm sr) reflected by the Moon is:
P˜moon =
aM
pi
SsunpiR
2
M (14)
where aM is the Moon albedo. Assuming the Moon at normal incidence, the solid angle
to the area on Earth Σ seen by the telescope is:
ΩΣ =
Σ
d2EM
(15)
where dEM is the distance Earth-Moon. The spectral radiant intensity after Lambertian
reflection from the Earth surface is:
S
(M)
E =
1
pi
aEaMSR
2
M
Σ
d2EM
(16)
The number of photons per second and nm of bandwidth entering the receiving telescope
(radius r, field-of-view IFOV ) is:
Nnight = αNday (17)
where:
α = aM
(
RM
dEM
)2
(18)
is the ratio between the background radiance at night-time (full Moon) and day-time.
Assuming the Moon albedo to be aM ≈ 0.12 we have that α is of the order of 10
−6:
during night-time, in full Moon conditions, we have approximately a reduction of six
orders of magnitude in the amount of background noise.
2.3. Down-link
2.3.1. Signal attenuation and turbulence The effect of the atmospheric turbulence on a
plane wavefront is a phenomenon very relevant to the FOV limit in the noise reduction
of a quantum channel, as seen above. In particular, the predominance of broadening of
the beam or of the rapid bending of the beam, described by the long- and short-terms in
the far-field width is a crucial information in order to design the optical system aimed
at the mitigation of the turbulence effects.
To this purpose, experimental data taken by means of a ground telescope are
suitable to be compared to the modeling presented before. In our experiment we have
acquired with a video recorder the flickering light from Vega (α-Lyrae, magnitude=0)
by the Matera Laser Ranging Observatory of Agenzia Spaziale Italiana in Matera,
Italy. The telescope has the primary mirror diameter of 1.5 m. The gathered light
was spectrally filtered in the green by the coated optical components of the CoudA˜¨
path, and acquired on the focal plane by a bidimensioanl sensor whose square pixel size
was of 6.7 µm. The collection of the frames were analyzed in order to extrac the first
two moments of the intensity distribution. The results is reported in the Figs .. ..
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Figure 4. Number of photons at day-time (left side) and night-time (right side)
as function of telescope IFOV where ∆ν = 1nm, ∆t = 1ns. The number of
background photons entering the telescope during night-time in full-Moon conditions
is approximately six order magnitude larger than the value for day-time operation.
2.3.2. Background light noise The background noise for a satellite-to-ground link was
examined in details by Miao et al. [20]. The noise power Pb received by a ground-based
telescope pointing a satellite in the sky can be expressed as:
Pb = Hb · Ωfov · pir
2 ·∆ν (19)
where Hb is the brightness of the sky background in W m
−2 sr−1 µm−1, Ωfov the field
of view of the telescope in sr and r its radius; ∆ν is the filter bandwidth. Hb is strongly
related to the weather conditions, for example during.
We calculated the signal-to-noise ratio for the downlink using our results for the
signal attenuation in a turbulent atmosphere and the noise parameters given in [20].
The results are shown in Fig. 6. On the left side, the down-link attenuation is shown as
a function of the link distance L and the radius of the Earth-based receiving telescope.
Two factors result in an increased performance for the downlink with respect to the
uplink. First, on Earth we can have larger receiving telescopes than in space. Second,
the beam first propagates in the vacuum with just diffraction spreading and gets in
contact with the turbulent atmosphere only in the final stage of propagation. Therefore
the aberrations introduced by turbulence only affect weakly the wavefront before it
enters the telescope.
On the right side of Fig. 6 we plotted the SNR as a function of the sky brightness
(∆ν = 1 nm, IFOV ). The SNR is greater than one only at night-time.
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Figure 5. Signal-to-noise ratio (in dB) at day-time (left side) and night-time (right
side) as a function of telescope IFOV and satellite distance. The curves on the left
sign correspond to negative values for the SNR in decibels; this means that the SNR
is lower than 1, clearly to low to establish a quantum communication link. On the
other hand, SNR as high as 100:1 or 1000:1 can be envisaged during night-time. The
operating wavelength is λ = 800 nm and the transmitting telescope diameter is 1.5 m.
We assume a filtering bandwidth ∆ν = 1 nm and a gating time of ∆t = 1 ns for the
detectors.
2.4. Filtering and synchronization
As discussed in the previous sections, in order to have a significant signal-to-noise ratio
to establish a quantum communication link, it is crucial to reduce the amount of noise.
Moreover, the management of detector dead-time is also a crucial point. Avalanche
single-photon detectors are characterized by a certain amount of time, after a detection
event, in which they cannot detect any more photons. For single-photon avalanche
photodiodes the dead time can vary from 40 to 100 ns. For this reason the detection of
a noise photon has a double negative effect: it decreases the final secure key rate and it
blinds the detector for the duration of the dead time preventing the detection of a good
photon. This is why very often QKD systems run in gated-mode: the detectors are
switched-on only when a signal photon is supposed to arrive. To allow the possibility
to gate the detectors, high-accuracy temporal synchronization is mandatory.
Filtering strategies can be divided in three categories: spectral, spatial and
temporal. Spectral filtering is pretty easy to implement even on a Space setting, just
employing interference filters which must be thermally stabilized. Spatial filtering can
be implemented acting on the receiving telescope field-of-view, in order to select only
photons coming from the right directions. A trade-off must be found between the need
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Figure 6. Simulations for the downlink. On the left side, link attenuation (in dB),
as a function of the diameter of the satellite-based transmitting telescope and of the
link distance L. On the right side, SNR of the link as a function of the sky background
noise for different link distances, assuming a diameter of the transmitting telescope
r = 15 cm. All simulations are performed assuming a diameter of the Earth-based
receiving telescope RX = 1.5 m, with field-of-view 0.016 degrees (corresponding to
MLRO, Matera)
of a strong spatial selectivity (to have efficient noise-reduction) and the possibility of
imperfect pointing, which would call for a relaxation in spatial filtering.
Figure 7. Data analysis of the KHz laser-ranging data of a typical passage of the
GRACE satellite (altitude around 400 km). On the left side time derivative of the
range time as a function of time, on the right-side histogram of the same quantity.
The temporal variation of the range time is around 40µs/s.
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In a Space environment, time filtering is a more delicate issue, because it requires
really good synchronization between two devices in fast relative motion. Such precise
synchronization is fundamental in order to discriminate the good photons from the
background noise and in order to have gated-mode operation of the detectors. For the
latter, the arrival time of a signal photon need to be known in advance, in order to open
the detector gate. Let’s focus to the case of an Earth-based station sending photons to an
orbiting receiver. Two different schemes have been used in the literature to synchronize
free-space QKD systems: self-synchronization and external synchronization.
In the case of self-synchronization a periodic bright pulse of a wavelength different
from the one of the signal photons can be used to open the detector gate. This technique
was used, for example, in one of the seminal experiments about free-space QKD by
Hughes and co-workers [21]. The waveform of the pulses can be shaped in order to code
in the synchronization frames some information regarding the communication itself. A
different option is to use an external synchronization technique, for example stabilized
local clocks and software-controlled phase-lock loop driven by the detected photon signal
(as described by Rarity et al. in [22]) or by the global positioning system (GPS) signal
(as done R. Ursin and coworkers for entanglement distribution over 144 Km in free-space
[10]). In the case of satellite-based quantum communication this technique requires the
precise a priori knowledge of the orbit, which makes it extremely unpractical.
Here we will focus on the self-synchronization technique, which we believe is easier
to realize in practice and gives the signal for the detector-gating control with no need
to know precisely the station-satellite distance. An interesting question is then what
repetition rate shall be imparted to the synchronization pulses in order to keep a control
on the satellite position on the order of the tens of centimeters (which correspond to
trip-times to the order of one nanosecond). In Fig. 7 we show some data analysis
performed on KHz laser ranging data for the GRACE satellite acquired by the Graz
Space Research Center. From the laser-ranging data we calculated the time derivative of
the photon trip-time from ground to the satellite and we plotted it on a histogram. The
results clearly show that the trip-time changes of the order of 40µs per second (which
corresponds to about 12 Km per second). This means that if we want to keep track of
the changes with an accuracy to the order of the nanosecond we need a repetition rate
for the synchronization of the order of 50− 100 KHz.
3. Polarization Control
A second crucial point for the implementation of quantum communication schemes based
on polarization-encoded qubits is, of course, the preservation of polarization states in
the channel.
As it was shown in [23], propagation in the atmosphere does not affect significantly
the polarization stets, nor does the Faraday effect due to the Earth magnetic field. The
use of curved optics in an off-axis configuration introduces some spatially-dependent
polarization effects [24] which can lead to global decoherence of the polarization-encoded
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Figure 8. Scheme of the satellite tracking system and its effect on polarization, as
discussed in [23]. A source on a satellite emits a stream of single photons, which are
directed to ground by a moving pointing mirror. A second pointing mirror on ground
receives the photons and whatever direction they come from, it sends them to the
detection apparatus. Due to the relative motion between the satellite and the ground
station, there is a relative rotation of the polarization axes and a change in the mirror
incidence angles, which induces a time-dependent polarization transformation on the
qubits.
Figure 9. Example of temporal evolution of the Stokes parameters at the receiver for
a fixed vertically-polarized state emitted on the satellite. In a few-minutes passage the
values of the Stokes parameters change dramatically in a smooth way.
qubits. However, the effect is small for on-axis optics and it can be neglected, just having
some care in the design of optical systems.
On the other hand, the relative motion of the satellite and the ground station
induces a time-dependent transformation on the polarization state as seen by the
receiver. This is mainly due to the relative rotation of the satellite vertical axis with
respect to ground and change in the polarization induced by reflection on mirrors at
time-varying angles. The effect, in the case of a single passage of a LEO satellite orbiting
at 400 Km from the Earth surface, is shown in Fig. 9: given a photon which is emitted
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with vertical-polarization in the satellite reference frame, the Stokes parameter seen by
the ground-based receiver are plotted as a function of time.
If we can neglect channel depolarization effects, as it is the case for atmospheric
propagation, polarization states can be represented by Jones vectors:[
A
Beiϕ
]
A,B, ϕ ∈ R A2 +B2 = 1 (20)
The channel properties are described by a 2-by-2 time-dependent Jones matrix C(t),
which transforms the polarization states according to J(t) = C(t)J0. To establish
a successful quantum link based on polarization-encoded qubits, such transformation
must be compensated. This can be done characterizing the channel without interfering
with the single-photon exchange, in order to measure such matrix C(t). Then, applying
the inverse transformation C−1(t) for every time instant t to the incoming photons, the
correct state can be restored before performing the measurements needed fro quantum
key distribution.
However, in general, not to interfere with the signal photon exchange, the
characterization of the channel Jones matrix is to be performed with different parameters
than the photon exchange. For example, a different wavelength may be employed, or
the two operations of channel-probing and quantum-communication can be performed
at in different time-slots. Defining CP (t) as the experimentally measured channel Jones
matrix, we have:
C−1P (t)C(t) = E(t) (21)
with E(t) → I, ∀t in the case of ideal compensation. Let {Eij(t)}, i, j = 1, 2 be the
elements of the matrix E(t).
In this Section we will discuss some polarization-compensation schemes, discussing
their effectiveness in the case of the model presented in [23]. Considering a BB84
quantum key distribution scheme, photons are transmitted in two non-orthogonal bases,
for example the horizontal/vertical one (states |H〉 and |V 〉) or the diagonal one (states
linearly polarized at ±45 degrees, that we will indicate respectively with |+〉 and |−〉
degrees). The average error probability is:
PE = 1− PHH − PV V − P++ − P−− (22)
where Pij is the temporal average of the conditional probability of measuring the state
i once j has been transmitted (Pij = 〈p(r = i|t = j)〉).
Suppose now to have a horizontally-polarized state transmitted at time ti. After
compensation, one gets the state:
J(ti) =
[
E11(ti) E12(ti)
E21(ti) E22(ti)
] [
1
0
]
=
[
E11(ti)
E21(ti)
]
(23)
so that the probability of obtaining the correct result is |E11(ti)|
2. Assuming that the
probability of transmitting a |H〉 state is 1
4
:
PHH =
1
4
〈
|E11|
2
〉
(24)
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With similar arguments one can find expressions for the other conditional probabilities
so that:
PE = 1−
1
8
〈{
3|E11|
2 + 3|E22|
2 + |E21|
2 + |E12|
2 + E∗11E22 + E11E
∗
22 + E
∗
12E21 + E12E
∗
21
}〉
(25)
3.1. Probe beam at a different wavelength
One possible way of measuring the channel Jones matrix without perturbing the single-
photon exchange is using a probe beam at a wavelength λp different from the one of the
signal beam (λs). In this case the signal transformation Jones matrix is C(λs), while
the compensation matrix is C(λp). Thefore:
E = C−1(λp)C(λs) (26)
Figure 10. Polarization-state preservation in the satellite-based quantum channel,
in the case of a channel-probing beam at a different wavelength with respect to the
signal. The bit error rate due to imperfect compensation is negligible even for probing
wavelengths quite far from the signal one (λs = 800 nm).
To have a statistical evaluation of the degree of compensation that can be achieved
with this technique we performed a simulation for 1000 passages of a LEO satellite
orbiting at 500 Km. We used the model described in [23] to calculate the matrices
C(λs) and C(λp) for a uniform temporal sampling of each passage (∆t = 1 s). Then
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we computed for each time instant the matrix E and the error probability PE , finally
averaging over time. The results are reported in Fig. 10, showing the QBER due to
compensation error as a function of λP . Perfect compensation is clearly possible using
a wavelength for the probe beam very close to that of the signal beam. However an
acceptable error rate (below one percent), is possible for wavelengths much more distant
than our signal one.
3.2. Time-multiplexing of signal and probe beam
A different compensation scheme can be time-multiplexing of signal and probe pulses at
the same wavelength in the channel. In this case, suppose to send the probe pulses with
repetition rate fP , so that the m-th probe pulse will be emitted at time t
(0)
m = mT0 with
T0 = 1/fP . Between any two probe pulses, N single-photon pulses will be transmitted,
each at the time tm,i = t
(0)
m +iδ where δ = T0/N . In other words, we measure the channel
Jones matrix C(t(0)m ) and use it to compensate N subsequent single-photon pulses:
J
[
t(0)m + iδ
]
= C−1(t(0)m )J0
[
t(0)m + iδ
]
(27)
The repetition rate of such pulses must be fast enough to characterize in real-time
the evolution of the channel properties. Assuming that this is the case, the amount of
change for a Stokes parameter Sj(t) at a time ∆t slightly after t
(0)
m is small and can be
expressed with a Taylor expansion to the first order:
Sj(t
(0)
m +∆t)− Sj(t
(0)
m ) ≈
dSj
dt
|
t=t
(0)
m
∆t (28)
If we want to keep the error on ∆Sj(t) under a certain value ∆Smax, the repetition rate
of the probing pulses must be:
fP ≥
1
∆Smax
dS
dt
|max (29)
Assuming a maximum value for the time-derivative of the Stokes parameters of 0.02
(see Fig. 11), and stating for the maximum acceptable error on the Stokes parameters
∆Smax = 10
−5, we get a value of fP = 2 KHz for the probe repetition rate. This value is
a large bound on the error, since |dS/dt| is in general much smaller than the maximum
value we took.
To have a statistical evaluation of the average error probability we performed some
simulations similar to what we did for the different-wavelengths scheme. In this case we
computed the probability error as a function of the repetition rate of the probe pulses.
The results are shown in Fig. 12.
4. Discussion
In this Section we will analyze the possibility of establishing a quantum key distribution
link in different configurations employing a LEO satellite and an optical ground station,
for different protocols. Throughout the whole Section, formulas for key-generation rate
in the asymptotic limit of a long key will be employed. This is clearly not true for
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Figure 11. Statistics of the time-derivative of the Stokes parameter S2 for 1000
passages of two satellites with different orbits (500 Km for the picture on the left, 5000
Km for the one on the right). The temporal evolution of the transformation is faster
for the lower-orbit satellite (the absolute value of the time derivative is within 0.015
s−1). For higher satellite the transformation is slower (within 0.005 s−1 for the figure
on the right)
real-world QKD experiments, especially in the cases involving the exchange of a secret
key between a LEO satellite and Earth. At present, the analysis of the security of
quantum key distribution for finite key lengths is still an open question [ref] in quantum
information theory.
4.1. BB84
The secret key rate per pulse for the BB84 protocol in the case of an ideal single-photon
source:
R
(ideal)
BB84 ≥
pexp
2
[1− f(e)H2(e)−H2 (e)] (30)
where pexp is the probability that a non-empty pulse is detected by Bob, e is the QBER,
f(e) is the efficiency of error correction and H2(x) is the binary entropy function:
H2(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). The efficiency of the classical error correction
algorithm is described by the factor f(e): we take f(e) ≈ 1.22.
In most pratical quantum communication experiments, single photons are
implemented with weak coherent pulses, for which there is a non-zero probability to
produce multiphoton states. On such multiphoton pulses Eve could perform a photon-
Some aspects on the feasibility of satellite quantum key distribution 17
Figure 12. Simulated quantum bit error rate due to imperfect polarization-
compensation in the case of a temporal-multiplexing scheme, as a function of the
channel-characterization pulses repetition rate. Data are shown for satellites at
different altitudes.
number-splitting (PNS) attack [25, 26, 27]. She can split a photon from the multiphoton
pulse, store it and measure it in the correct basis after Alice and Bob have pubblicly
announced their bases. If she sends the rest of the multiphoton pulse to Bob no noise
will be introduce in the channel and she can get complete information about the bit
without being discovered. Such bits, that have leaked information to the eavesdropper,
are called tagged bits. Inamory et al. [28] and Gottesmann et al. [29] showed that in
this situation a secure key can still be distilled and the key generation rate is given by:
RBB84 ≥
pexp
2
[
(1−∆)− f(e)H2(e)− (1−∆)H2
(
e
1−∆
)]
(31)
In the case of an uplink to a LEO satellite the channel is extremely lossy and almost
all the single-photon pulses may be wasted, resulting in basically only multiphoton pulses
giving clicks in Bob’s detectors. Therefore, increasing the channel losses, the fraction
of secure bits decreases. If the losses are so strong that only multiphoton pulses are
detectd by Bob, no secure key can be generated.
As a worst-case estimate of the fraction of tagged bits ∆ we can take the fraction
of multiphoton pulses over the fraction on non-empty pulses detected by Bob [26]:
∆ ≈
1− e−µ − µe−µ
1− e−ηµ
(32)
In general, given a link attenuation η the key generation rate is of the order of O(η2)
(see [30]).
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Figure 13. Key-generation rate for the BB84 protocol using weak laser pulses as an
approximate single-photon source. On the left side, results for the up-link, in the right
side results for the downlink. For the uplink, the channel attenuation is so high that
a QKD session with significant key generation rates cannot be implemented, while for
the downlinka key-generation rate of 10−4 for a satellite orbiting at around 500 km
can be obtained using a source with mean photon number µ = 0.01.
Simulations for the key-generation rate as a function of the link distance are shown
in Fig. 13. In the case of the uplink the attenuation is so high that the secure key
generation rate is extremely low (of the order of 10−12), on the other hand it is not
possible to increase the value of µ in order to avoid PNS attacks.
For the downlink, on the contrary, a successful establishment of a BB84 QKD link
is possible. Assuming µ = 0.01 (see Fig. 13) and a source repetition rate of 10 MHz,
for a satellite at 500-600 km we can get around 1 kbit of secure key per second.
4.2. Decoy-state
To improve the performance of coherent-state weak-pulse QKD, the decoy state method
has been proposed [31, 32, 33]. For BB84 protocol, the security analysis is performed
using a worst-case estimate on the fraction of bits that are known to the eavesdropper.
The decoy-state technique, on the other hand, exploits states with different light
intensities to probe the channel transmissivity and error probability, giving a more
accurate bound on the amount of tagged bits.
Suppose to use a three-state decoy technique, which exploits vacuum states and two
coherent states with mean photon number µ and µ′. Let Smu be Bob’s counting rate
when Alice transmits pulses with mean photon number µ and S0 be Bob’s counting rate
in the case of vacuum-state transmission (therefore due to dark counts and background
noise). The bound for ∆ is [30]:
∆ ≤
µ
µ′ − µ
(
µe−µSµ′
µ′e−µ′Sµ
− 1
)
+
µe−µS0
µ′Sµ
(33)
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Probing the channel with different light intensity we can get a more accurate
estimate of ∆. Consequently, we can guarantee unconditional security without reducing
too much the mean photon number of the pulses.
Figure 14. Key-generation rate for the BB84 protocol using a three-level decoy-state
protocol (vacuum, µ = 0.27, µ′ = 0.4). A secure key rate of 10−6 can be obtained for
an uplink to satellite orbiting at around 500 km.
In Fig. 14 we show some simulations performed for a three-state decoy method,
which employs the vacuum and two coherent-beam intensities µ = 0.27 and µ′ = 0.4.
Clearly there is a significant improvement in the key-generation rate, from O(η2) to
O(η). For a source repetition rate of 10 MHz, in the case of an uplink to a satellite at
500 km, we would still be able to get a key generation rate of 10 bits per seconds, as
compared to the value of 10−5 bits per second one would get for the BB84 protocol with
no decoy states.
The main problem in the practical implementation of the decoy-state technique
in a a satellite link is the unavoidable intensity fluctuations in such a link due to the
fast relative motion of the communication terminals. The situation of decoy-state QKD
with intensity fluctuations has been recently analyzed by Xian-Bin Wang in [34], who
showed that if the intensity-error of each pulse is random, the decoy-state protocol can
work efficiently even in the case of large intensity errors.
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4.3. Entangled photons
A detailed analysis of the conditions to violate Bell inequalities and implement a
quantum key distribution experiment based on Ekert’s protocol has been presented
in [19]. As the minimum requirement they assume the SNR needed to violate a
Bell-inequality [35]. For the case of polarization-entangled photons this necessitates
a coincidence visibility of at least 71 percent, corresponding to a SNR of 6 : 1. Below
that ratio it is possible to model the observed correlation with a local realistic theory,
allowing unobserved eavesdropping.
Figure 15. SNR (in dB) for entanglement-based experiments in different
configurations.
However, in the analysis they only consider the effect of dark counts, neglecting the
effect of background noise. The rate of accidental coincidences is:
Cacc = N1N2∆t (34)
while the rate of good coincidencres is:
C = P0η1η2 (35)
where ηi is the efficiency of the link i. In our simulations we use the link efficiencies
and the noise values calculated in Section 2 for satellite links, while in the case of
local detection we use ηi ≈ 0.5 and for the noise counts just the detector dark counts
(Ni ≈ 200 counyts per second). P0 is the emission rate of the entangled-photon pairs:
values of the order of 106−107 pairs per second are currently available using for examples
periodically-poled nonlinear crystals.
We consider four different scenarios:
• source is on the satellite, with two ground receivers (the scheme proposed for the
SpaceQUEST experiment [36])
• source on the satellite with one local receiver and the other one on ground
• source on ground, with two satellite-based receivers
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• source on ground with one local receiver and the other one on satellite
All simulations were performed for night-time new moon conditions. The results are
shown in Fig.15. It is clear that entanglement-based experiments with one photon
measured locally at the source and the other one propagating either in the uplink or
downlink are feasible, due to sufficient SNR (of the order of 100:1 to 1000:1). On the
other hand a ground-based source with two uplinks to satellite is clearly un-feasible.
The situation with a source on the satellite and two Earth-based receiving telescope is
feasible, but only under some stringent requirements on the experimental parameters
(telescope diameter, link distance, filtering...).
5. Conclusions
In this paper we discussed some aspects of the feasibility of satellite-based quantum key
distribution which we believe were not yet addressed in the literature.
First of all, we discussed signal propagation through a turbulent atmosphere,
refining the models presented in [19], [37]. In particular for the uplink we analyzed
the relative contribution of beam spreading and wandering, showing that the former is
more important than the latter for low-altitude satellites. This makes the possibility
of compensating the beam wandering with an active tip/tilt mirror not worth. Then
we introduced a model for the background noise of the channel during night-time and
day-time, and we discussed the signal-to-noise ratio for different configurations.
Second, we discussed the polarization properties of a satellite-based quantum
channel, discussing two possible compensation techniques to the effects illustrated
in [23]. For both techniques (channel-probing at a different wavelength and time-
multiplexing of signal and probe pulses at the same wavelength) we showed that the bit
error rate can be kept at really low levels.
Finally we discussed the generation rate of a secure key for different configurations
and for different protocols. For the standard BB84 protocol (with Poissonian-distributed
source) we showed that a QKD link can be established for the downlink with a
good generation rate, but not for the uplink. On the other hand, a QKD uplink
can be realized with the more accurate estimate of the fraction of bits for which an
eavesdropper could have complete information without introducing any disturbance,
provide by the decoy-state techniques. Two points are still unclear in our opinion:
the effect of the finite duration of the satellite link to the securire key generation and
the possibility to implement the decoy-state technique in a channel with strong and
random intensity fluctuations. We also discussed the implementation of entanglement-
based links, showing that configurations with one photon detected locally at the source
and one propagating either in pulink or downlink is feasible with realistic experiemntal
parameters. The situation with a source on satellite and two ground-based receivers is
also feasile, but with particular care on the choice of the relevant hardware parameters.
In conclusion, we believe that satellite-based quantum key distribution is certainly
feasible with present technology. We also believe that Space technology can provide a
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rich environment for experiments on foundational quantum mechanics and on quantum-
information applications.
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